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INTENSIONAL SEMANTICS AND NATURAL LANGUAGE 
F. v. Kutsc h e r a 
I have been asked to g i v e a b r i e f survey of the 
c o n n e c t i o n s between i n t e n s i o n a l semantics and semantics 
f o r n a t u r a l languages, i . e . between a branch o f l o g i c and 
one o f l i n g u i s t i c s . S i n c e these c o n n e c t i o n s are the 
r e s u l t o f a s t i l l v ery a c t i v e development, t h i s survey 
can o n l y be concerned w i t h the g e n e r a l o u t l i n e s and so i s 
not addressed to the s p e c i a l i s t s i n the f i e l d . My aim i s 
j u s t t o g i v e those o f you who have not s t u d i e d 
i n t e n s i o n a l l o g i c an i n k l i n g o f what i t i s about, and how 
i t s language i s employed i n the a n a l y s i s o f n a t u r a l 
languages. I s h a l l , however, have to presuppose some 
b a s i c knowledge of elementary l o g i c . 
I 
F i r s t , l e t me b r i e f l y s k e t c h the development i n 
t h e o r e t i c a l l i n g u i s t i c s t h a t has been l e a d i n g up t o 
today's c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h l o g i c . 
L o g i c f i r s t gained i n f l u e n c e i n l i n g u i s t i c s when i t s 
standards o f p r e c i s e n e s s f o r the s y n t a c t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n 
o f languages were taken over by l i n g u i s t s . I t i s , among 
o t h e r s , the m e r i t o f Y. B a r - H i l l e l and of N. Chomsky t o 
have f i r m l y i m p l a n t e d t h i s i d e a i n modern grammar. Modern 
l o g i c from i t s b e g i n n i n g - e s s e n t i a l l y s i n c e Frege's 
" B e g r i f f s s c h r i f t " (1879) - has been u s i n g a r t i f i c i a l 
languages t h a t are s y n t a c t i c a l l y and, s i n c e T a r s k i ' s 
paper on the concept o f t r u t h o f 1931» a l s o s e m a n t i c a l l y 
b u i l t up i n a r i g o r o u s manner. The, so t o speak, 
i d e a l i z e d l a b o r a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s under which such 
a r t i f i c i a l languages are c o n s t r u c t e d a l l o w an e x a c t n e s s 
o f t h e i r grammatical r u l e s , and t h e r e f o r e of l i n g u i s t i c 
a n a l y s i s t h a t c o n t r a s t s v e r y p o s i t i v e l y w i t h the vague 
concepts and the a s s e r t i o n s o f d o u b t f u l g e n e r a l i t y i n 
t r a d i t i o n a l grammar. C l e a r l y , n a t u r a l languages, e v o l v i n g 
from l o n g h i s t o r i c a l developments, are much more complex 
and d i f f i c u l t t o d e s c r i b e by e x a c t r u l e s than c o n s t r u c t e d 
languages, t h a t are s i m p l y d e f i n e d by such r u l e s . But i f 
the p r o p e r t y o f w e l l - f o r m e d n e s s o f the sentences o f 
n a t u r a l language L i s d e c i d a b l e , as i t s h o u l d be, then on 
Church's t h e s i s on the m a t h e m a t i c a l d e f i n a b i l i t y of the 
concept o f d e c i d a b i l i t y , and i n view o f the development 
o f g e n e r a l systems f o r g e n e r a t i n g d e c i d a b l e s e t s o f 
e x p r e s s i o n s i n metamathematics, t h e r e must be such 
systems f o r g e n e r a t i n g the sentences of L. G e n e r a t i v e 
grammar mo s t l y uses Semi-Thue-systems. These, i n e f f e c t , 
are the Chomsky-grammars P r o f e s s o r Lindenmayer mentions 
i n h i s paper. I f "S" ( f o r " s e n t e n c e " ) , "NP" ( f o r "noun 
p h r a s e " ) , "VP" ( f o r "verb p h r a s e " ) , "A" ( f o r " a r t i c l e " ) , 
"N" ( f o r "noun"), "VT" ( f o r " t r a n s i t i v e v e r b " ) , e t c . are 
g r ammatical symbols, and the e x p r e s s i o n s from the l e x i c o n 
of L p r o v i d e the t e r m i n a l v o c a b u l a r y , the w e l l - f o r m e d 
sentences o f L can ( i n a f i r s t a p p r o x i m a t i o n ) be 
d e s c r i b e d as the e x p r e s s i o n s d e r i v a b l e from the symbol S 
by a p p l i c a t i o n s o f the r u l e s of the system. These r u l e s 
are o f the form X(TY->X TY, where r i s a grammatical 
symbol and X such a symbol of a t e r m i n a l e x p r e s s i o n . 
With such r u l e s we can d e r i v e , f o r i n s t a n c e , the sentence 
"The man h i t s the dog" i n the f o l l o w i n g way: 
S 
A N VT NP 
A N 
The man h i t s the dog 
T h i s model has the advantage o f being f a m i l i a r f o r 
l i n g u i s t i c s : the sentences o f a language are analysed 
i n t o a l i n e a r l y concatenated sequence o f c o n s t i t u e n t s and 
t h i s p a s s i n g o p e r a t i o n can be performed at v a r i o u s l e v e l s 
o f g e n e r a l i t y to y i e l d a h i e r a r c h i c a l branching-diagram. 
There are many c o m p l i c a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s grammatical 
model t h a t I s h a l l not d w e l l upon here. Let me j u s t say 
t h a t the end-expressions o f such d e r i v a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t 
o n l y the d e e p - s t r u c t u r e s o f the sentences of L which i n 
many cases do not c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e i r s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e s 
i . e . t h e i r normal grammatical forms. These have to be 
d e r i v e d from the deep s t r u c t u r e s by t r a n s f o r m a t i o n r u l e s 
which r e a r r a n g e the e x p r e s s i o n s , take care o f congruence, 
mode, number, e t c . 
But even i f you count the theory of Semi-Thue-Systems as 
a l o g i c a l t h e o r y , t h i s i s not a s y n t a c t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f 
the sentences of L t h a t c o u l d be termed " l o g i c a l " i n any 
s t r i c t e r sense, s i n c e i t i s based on the c a t e g o r i e s "verb 
phrase" e t c . o f t r a d i t i o n a l grammar. So t h i s was a s t e p 
i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s o f n a t u r a l 
language but i t d i d not c a r r y v e r y f a r . 
The f i r s t attempt at a g e n e r a t i v e semantics as made by 
Fodor and K a t z i n (63) was even l e s s s u c c e s s f u l . They 
t r i e d t o c o o r d i n a t e s e m a n t i c a l r u l e s t o the s y n t a c t i c a l 
ones, but s i n c e the b a s i c type o f t h e i r s e m a n t i c a l 
p r o j e c t i o n r u l e s was o n l y t h a t of forming a c o n j u n c t i o n 
o f one-place a t t r i b u t e s , t h i s attempt ended i n f a i l u r e . 
The f a i l u r e , however, o f these p r o j e c t s t o i n t e g r a t e 
l o g i c a l i d e a l s i n t o the framework o f t r a d i t i o n a l grammar 
c l e a r e d the way t o l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s e s t h a t are l o g i c a l 
i n a deeper sense. The i d e a seemed more and more 
a t t r a c t i v e t o depart from the c a t e g o r i e s o f t r a d i t i o n a l 
grammar and use l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s i n s t e a d , as developed 
by K. A j d u k i e w i c z , S t . Lèsniewski, Y. B a r - H i l l e l , H.B. 
Curry and o t h e r s , and t o r e p r e s e n t the d e e p - s t r u c t u r e of 
the sentences by formulae o f a l o g i c a l language. 
S y n t a c t i c a l l y , t h i s i d e a was not very r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i n c e 
a l o t o f the c o m p l i c a t i o n s o f n a t u r a l languages were 
a l r e a d y d e f e r r e d t o the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l p a r t o f the 
grammar, which now c o u l d be l e f t e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged. 
The o n l y s y n t a c t i c a l problem was not t o make the deep 
s t r u c t u r e too d i f f e r e n t from the s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e o f a 
sentence which i t w i l l be i f the u s u a l l o g i c a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s used. 
Semantics, however, at f i r s t p r esented the* d i f f i c u l t y 
t h a t n a t u r a l languages are f u l l o f n o n - e x t e n s i o n a l 
c o n t e x t s , w h i l e l o g i c , t i l l about 15 y e a r s ago, had o n l y 
e x t e n s i o n a l semantics t o o f f e r and then t i l l about the 
end o f the s i x t i e s o n l y i n t e n s i o n a l semantics f o r 
elementary types o f language. 
W.V. Quine i n h i s paper "The Problem o f Meaning i n 
L i n g u i s t i c s " (51) and i n o t h e r papers s i n c e has argued 
t h a t , w h i l e the theory o f r e f e r e n c e , i . e . o f the 
e x t e n s i o n s o f e x p r e s s i o n s i s , thanks t o the work o f 
T a r s k i and o t h e r s , a sound and r i g o r o u s d i s c i p l i n e , the 
th e o r y o f meaning i s s t i l l i n a d e s o l a t e s t a t e s i n c e i t 
has not even been a b l e t o d e f i n e i t s b a s i c n o t i o n s , as 
those o f p r o p o s i t i o n , a t t r i b u t e , synonymity, a n a l y t i c i t y , 
e t c . Neither, a c c o r d i n g t o Quine, was i t ever l i k e l y t o 
a t t a i n the s t a t e o f a sound d i s c i p l i n e s i n c e these 
concepts cannot be r i g o r o u s l y d e f i n e d . To vary a 
W i t t g e n s t e i n e a n d i ctum, Quine thought t h a t a l l t h a t can 
be s a i d c l e a r l y can be s a i d i n an e x t e n s i o n a l language, 
and whereof we cannot speak c l e a r l y , we should be s i l e n t . 
In h i s book "Meaning and N e c e s s i t y " ( 4 7 ) , however, R. 
Carnap had a l r e a d y shown the way t o a r i g o r o u s d e f i n i t i o n 
o f these concepts i n the same s e t - t h e o r e t i c a l framework 
e x t e n s i o n a l semantics uses. H i s i d e a was r o u g h l y t h i s : I f 
we know the meaning o f A we know i n which p o s s i b l e worlds 
i t i s t r u e . The i n v e r s i o n o f t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s not so 
ob v i o u s : Do we know the meaning o f a sentence i f we know 
under which c o n d i t i o n s i t would be t r u e ? But we can at 
l e a s t d e f i n e a concept o f i n t e n s i o n as a f i r s t 
a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o t h a t o f meaning by p o s t u l a t i n g t h a t t h i s 
i n v e r s i o n h o l d s . Then we have f o r two sentences A and B: 
The i n t e n s i o n o f A i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h a t o f B i f f they 
have the same t r u t h v a l u e i n a l l p o s s i b l e w o r l d s . 
And we can d e f i n e the i n t e n s i o n o f A by a b s t r a c t i o n t o be 
t h a t f u n c t i o n f , such t h a t f o r every world i f ( i ) i s the 
t r u t h v a l u e o f A i n i . T h i s can be g e n e r a l i z e d f o r o t h e r 
types o f e x p r e s s i o n s : The i n t e n s i o n o f ari e x p r e s s i o n E, i s 
t h a t f u n c t i o n which a s s i g n s t o every world jL the 
e x t e n s i o n o f E i n i . 
A p o s s i b l e w o r l d i s no d i s t a n t cosmos on whose e x i s t e n c e 
we s p e c u l a t e , b u t , as our world can be d e f i n e d , a c c o r d i n g 
t o W i t t g e n s t e i n , as the s e t of a l l f a c t s , a p o s s i b l e 
w o r l d , or s i m p l y a world can be d e f i n e d as a s e t o f 
p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t i s c o n s i s t e n t and maximal, i . e . a 
"complete n o v e l " . 
As two l o g i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t sentences l i k e "2 + 2 = 4" 
and "dx /dx = 2x" have i d e n t i c a l i n t e n s i o n s but d i f f e r e n t 
meanings - meanings are t o be d e f i n e d as t h a t two 
e x p r e s s i o n s , t h a t are i d e n t i c a l i n meaning, may be 
s u b s t i t u t e d f o r each o t h e r i n a l l c o n t e x t s s a l v a v e r i t a t e 
- i n t e n s i o n s are but a p p r o x i m a t i o n s t o meanings. They 
a r e , however, good a p p r o x i m a t i o n s s i n c e i t i s p o s s i b l e , 
as we s h a l l see, t o d e f i n e meanings w i t h the h e l p o f 
i n t e n s i o n s . 
Carnap's i d e a s were f i r s t put t o use i n modal l o g i c by S. 
K r i p k e and o t h e r s , a l t h o u g h w i t h a s l i g h t m o d i f i c a t i o n o f 
the b a s i c i d e a : i n s t e a d o f s e t s o f worlds they used s e t s 
o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . The language L i s t h a t o f 
p r o p o s i t i o n a l or of f i r s t - o r d e r p r e d i c a t e l o g i c w i t h an 
a d d i t i o n a l s e n t e n t i a l o p e r a t o r N f o r n e c e s s i t y , and a 
model of L i s a s e t of f u n c t i o n <t> w i t h i e l t h a t have 
the p r o p e r t i e s o f the u s u a l e x t e n s i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
w h i l e * (NA) depends not o n l y on 4> (A) but a l s o on the 
v a l u e s 4>.(A) w i t h j ^ i . A model f o r p r o p o s i t i o n a l l o g i c 
f o r i n s t a n c e i s a t r i p l e <I, S, 4> >, so t h a t 
a) I i s a non-empty s e t of w o r l d s (or of i n d i c e s f o r 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ) . 
b) For a l l i € l , S i s a subset of I w i t h i € i s t o 
be the s e t of a l l w o r l d s a c c e s s i b l e from i . D i f f e r e n t 
concepts of n e c e s s i t y may be o b t a i n e d by d i f f e r e n t 
s t i p u l a t i o n s f o r these s e t s S . 
i 
c) For a l l i € I , i s a f u n c t i o n from the s e t of 
sentences i n t o the s e t { t , f} of t r u t h - v a l u e s so t h a t 
c1) 4> s a t i s f i e s the c o n d i t i o n s f o r e x t e n s i o n a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , and 
c2) * (NA) = t i f f S.C [A] , 
where[A] i s the s e t { j € l : * (A) = t\ of A-worlds. 
j 
Such i n t e n t i o n a l models made i t p o s s i b l e f o r the f i r s t 
time t o d e f i n e the f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s of the i n t u i t i v e 
n o t i o n s of n e c e s s i t y e x a c t l y and t o prove the soundness 
and completeness of systems of modal l o g i c s w i t h r e s p e c t 
t o such n o t i o n s . Up to K r i p k e ' s work t h e r e was a host of 
competing a x i o m a t i c systems o f modal l o g i c , w h i l e nobody 
c o u l d j u s t i f y h i s i n t u i t i o n t h a t h i s axioms should make 
up an adequate system, nor say e x a c t l y how h i s n o t i o n o f 
n e c e s s i t y compared w i t h o t h e r s . D i f f e r e n t concepts o f 
n e c e s s i t y c o u l d now be d i s t i n g u i s h e d s e m a n t i c a l l y as we 
p o i n t e d o u t , by the c o n d i t i o n s they impose on S . For 
i n s t a n c e , i f S = 1 f o r a l l i € l then N expr e s s e s the i n o t i o n of a n a l y t i c a l n e c e s s i t y - i . e . NA h o l d s i f f A i s 
t r u e i n a l l p o s s i b l e w o r l d s , or i n a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . On 
the other hand, i f we determine S as the s e t of a l l 
i 
w o r l d s i n which the same n a t u r a l laws h o l d as i n i then 
NA i s t r u e i f f A i s a consequence of the laws of n a t u r e . 
There has been a l o t of f r u i t f u l r e s e a r c h i n modal l o g i c 
i n the wider sense s i n c e , i n c l u d i n g f o r i n s t a n c e d e o n t i c , 
e p i s t e m i c and c o n d i t i o n a l l o g i c . I n s t e a d of s e t s S^ 
f a m i l i e s of s e t s or f a m i l i e s of s e t s of s e t s were used. 
But a l l t h i s d i d not g i v e the g e n e r a l framework f o r the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s s o r t of semantics t o n a t u r a l 
languages. What was needed was a r i c h e r language than 
t h a t of f i r s t - o r d e r p r e d i c a t e l o g i c , and a sim p l e and 
g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n f o r the d i f f e r e n t types of 
i n t e n s i o n a l f u n c t o r s . 
T h i s was p r o v i d e d at the end of the s i x t i e s i n s e v e r a l 
p a pers, foremost i n R. Montague's " U n i v e r s a l Grammar" 
(7 0 ) . Let me b r i e f l y s k e t c h h i s language, c a l l i t M, i n 
an e x t e n s i o n a l and an i n t e n s i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , so t h a t 
we get a b e t t e r n o t i o n of what i n t e n s i o n a l semantics i s 
l i k e . 
F i r s t we d e f i n e c a t e g o r i e s : 
D1: a) er and v are c a t e g o r i e s ( o f sentences and proper 
names). 
b) I f x and p are c a t e g o r i e s , x (p) i s a c a t e g o r y ( o f 
f u n c t o r s which a p p l i e d t o e x p r e s s i o n s o f c a t e g o r y 
p produce e x p r e s s i o n s o f c a t e g o r y x ) . 
So a one-place p r e d i c a t e i s a f u n c t o r o f the c a t e g o r y 
< j(v), s i n c e i t produces sentences i f a p p l i e d t o proper 
names; and the o p e r a t o r i x f o r d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s i s a 
f u n c t o r o f c a t e g o r y v ( j ( v ) ) , s i n c e i t produces a proper 
name i f a p p l i e d t o a one-place p r e d i c a t e . (We can w r i t e 
< r(v,v,•••,v) f o r a ( v ) ( v ) . . . ( v ) , i . e . f o r the c a t e g o r i e s 
o f n-place p r e d i c a t e s ) . 
M i s to c o n t a i n the symbols X ( f o r f u n c t i o n a l 
a b s t r a c t i o n ) , = ( f o r i d e n t i t y ) , b r a c k e t s and an i n f i n i t e 
s u p p l y o f c o n s t a n t s and v a r i a b l e s f o r each c a t e g o r y . 
The w e l l - f o r m e d e x p r e s s i o n s of M are c a l l e d terms of 
M: 
D2: a) A l l c o n s t a n t s o f M o f c a t e g o r y x are terms of 
cate g o r y x. 
b) I f F i s a term of c a t e g o r y x ( p ) and t a term of 
ca t e g o r y p F ( t ) i s a term of ca t e g o r y x. 
c) I f A[b] i s a term of c a t e g o r y x and b a c o n s t a n t 
and x a v a r i a b l e (not o c c u r r i n g i n A[b]) o f 
ca t e g o r y p, then XxACX] i s a term of c a t e g o r y 
t ( p ) . 
d) I f s and t are terms of the same c a t e g o r y , (s=t) 
i s a term o f c a t e g o r y a. 
For the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of M we f i r s t d e f i n e the s e t s of 
p o s s i b l e e x t e n s i o n s o f terms of c a t e g o r y T r e l a t i v e t o 
the u n i v e r s e of d i s c o u r s e U: 
D3: E = U v,U 
E = { t , f } <r,U E 
x,U 
E " E x(p),U " x,U 
B 
where A i s the s e t of f u n c t i o n s from B i n t o A. 
D4: An e x t e n s i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f M over U i s a 
f u n c t i o n $ such t h a t 
a) <t> (a) e E f o r a l l c o n s t a n t s a of c a t e g o r y 
x,U 
b) * F ( t ) ) = * ( F ) ( * ( t ) > . 
c <t>(XxA[x]) i s the f u n c t i o n f€E so t h a t f o r a l l 
x(p),U 
<*>' w i t h <ï>» = 4> f ( * ' ( b ) ) = *'(A[b}) (where the b 
c o n s t a n t b does not occur i n XxA[x] and 4>' = <t> 
b 
says t h a t <&' and 4> c o i n c i d e w i t h the p o s s i b l e 
e x c e p t i o n of the v a l u e s <t>(b) and ^ • ( b ) ) . 
d) 4>(s=t) = t i f f 4>(s)= 4>(t). 
M i s a t y p e - t h e o r e t i c a l language w i t h p r e d i c a t e s t r e a t e d 
as t r u t h v a l u e f u n c t i o n s as Frege proposed i n h i s 
"F u n k t i o n und B e g r i f f " (1891) and two and more-place 
f u n c t i o n s t r e a t e d as one-place f u n c t i o n s as i n 
combinatory l o g i c . As T a r s k i has shown we can d e f i n e the 
u s u a l l o g i c a l o p e r a t o r s , "I ,V,A,€ i n M. 
I n t e n s i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of M may then be d e f i n e d 
t h u s : We supplement the a l p h a b e t of M by two new symbols 
\x and 6 . \it i s t o be an e x p r e s s i o n whose e x t e n s i o n i s the 
i n t e n s i o n of t . |jt t o c c u r r i n g i n s t e a d of t s i g n i f i e s t h a t 
t stands i n an i n d i r e c t or n o n - e x t e n s i o n a l c o n t e x t , where 
i t s e x t e n s i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o Frege, i s i t s u s u a l 
i n t e n s i o n . We need then new c a t e g o r i e s f o r such 
e x p r e s s i o n s and i n c o r p o r a t e i n t o D1 the c o n d i t i o n : 
D1c: I f X i s a c a t e g o r y then i ( x ) i s a c a t e g o r y ( o f 
e x p r e s s i o n s of the form p.t). 
and i n t o D3 the d e f i n i t i o n : 
I 
L ( X ) , U = X,U 9 
so t h a t e x t e n s i o n s of e x p r e s s i o n s of c a t e g o r y i ( x ) are 
i n t e n s i o n s of e x p r e s s i o n s of c a t e g o r y x. 
6 i s t o be an o p e r a t o r such t h a t 6|it=t. The o p e r a t o r h 
d e - i n t e n s i o n a l i z e s t , t h e r e f o r e . D2 i s then supplemented 
by two s t i p u l a t i o n s : 
e) I f t i s a term of c a t e g o r y x , | i t i s a term of c a t e g o r y 
i ( x ) . 
f ) I f t i s a term of c a t e g o r y t ( x ) , 6 t i s a term o f 
c a t e g o r y x. 
D5: An i n t e n s i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of M over U and I (a 
non-empty s e t of worlds) i s a f u n c t i o n <t> such t h a t 
f o r a l l i € l : 
a) s a t i s f i e s the c o n d i t i o n s f o r e x t e n s i o n a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of M over U a c c o r d i n g to D4. 
b) (p,t) = >Tj<ï>.(t) (where X* i s a m e t a l i n g u i s t i c 
symbol f o r f u n c t i o n a l a b s t r a c t i o n ) . 
c) * i ( 6 a ) = * <a)(i> . 
Instead- of NA we have t o w r i t e N^iA now; N i s a f u n c t o r o f 
c a t e g o r y a(i(a)) i p r o d u c i n g sentences i f a p p l i e d t o terms 
e x p r e s s i n g i n t e n s i o n s of s e n t e n c e s . The e x t e n s i o n of N i n 
a w o r l d i i s t h a t f u n c t i o n g^ from 
•W» " {w'f} 
such t h a t f o r a l l f u n c t i o n s h from { w j f } 1 g (h)=w i f f f o r 
a l l j € l , we have j€Sj D h ( j ) =w. The i n t e n s i o n o f N i s i -s t h a t f u n c t i o n from E^ / * which c o o r d i n a t e s t o every u ( i ( a ) ) 
i e l t h e f u n c t i o n g^. The o p e r a t o r 6 i s used o n l y i n a few 
c a s e s ; f o r i n s t a n c e i n case you want t o q u a n t i f y over 
i n t e n s i o n s o f names as i n XxNjiF(6(x)) i n s t e a d o f over 
t h e i r e x t e n s i o n s as i n X y N ^ F ( y ) ) . 
C o n d i t i o n (c) of DM now i s t o be m o d i f i e d so t h a t * 1 
i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i t h fc'^Cb) = <*>}(b) f o r a l l j € l : We 
want t o q u a n t i f y over E i f b i s o f c a t e g o r y p , and P, U I s i n c e t h e r e are more f u n c t i o n s i n E than o b j e c t s o f p, U E and s i n c e <f>' (A[b]> may depend on v a l u e s <*>• (b) f o r P U * i j j * i , we must r e s t r i c t the 4>'s a c c o r d i n g l y . I f <t>v.(A[b]) 
does not depend on v a l u e s <t> (b) f o r j ^ i , then the n a t u r e 
o f the r e s t r i c t i o n does not m a t t e r ; i f i t does, then 
XxA[x] may make no sense - t h a t was Quine*s argument 
a g a i n s t q u a n t i f y i n g i n t o modal c o n t e x t s - and i n t h a t 
case a g a i n any r e s t r i c t i o n w i l l do. I f we i n t e r p r e t 
i n d i v i d u a l c o n s t a n t s b as s t a n d a r d names, however, so 
t h a t • ^ ( a ) = <t>.(a) f o r a l l j € l - and S. K r i p k e has g i v e n 
good reasons f o r t h a t i n "Naming and N e c e s s i t y " (72) -
then q u a n t i f i c a t i o n over i n d i v i d u a l s i n t o modal c o n t e x t s 
makes sense, the same sense as our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
e x p r e s s i o n s o f the form X x A [ x ] . 
Quine's argument, b r i e f l y , was t h i s : The p r i n c i p l e 
NF(a) -> VxNF(x) does not h o l d , s i n c e V x N ^ m e a n s "There 
i s one i d e n t i c a l o b j e c t t o which the p r e d i c a t e F a p p l i e s 
i n a l l the w o r l d s a c c e s s i b l e from o u r s " , w h i l e , i f a 
names d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t s i n d i f f e r e n t a c c e s s i b l e w o r l d s , 
NF(a) does not impl y the e x i s t e n c e o f such an o b j e c t . 
G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , f o r modal c o n t e x t s A the p r i n c i p l e 
A[a} — V x A [ x ] , which i s a t r u t h of e x t e n s i o n a l l o g i c , 
holds only f o r standard names a; f o r other names we have 
only A[a]AVxN(x=a)D VxA[A]. 
A word may be i n order on the much di s c u s s e d problem 
whether a l l the worlds i n the set I should c o n t a i n the 
same i n d i v i d u a l s , as we have s t i p u l a t e d , f o l l o w i n g 
Montague, or not, and how t r a n s - w o r l d - i d e n t i t y i s to be 
understood, or i f there can only be correspondences, 
c o u n t e r p a r t - r e l a t i o n s as D. Lewis suggests i n (68) e.g. 
but no i d e n t i t i e s . 
F i r s t the o b j e c t s i n U are to be p o s s i b l e o b j e c t s . For 
each world i € l we may i n t r o d u c e s e t s UCU of o b j e c t s 
i 
e x i s t i n g i n i and these s e t s may be d i f f e r e n t f o r 
d i f f e r e n t i f s . I f E i s a constant of category a ( v ) and 
4> (E)=U we may d e f i n e q u a n t i f i c a t i o n over e x i s t i n g 
i i a 
i n s t e a d of p o s s i b l e o b j e c t s i n the manner of Free L o g i c 
by A x A [ x ] := Ax(E(x) D A [ x ] ) . Second we can take the 
i d e n t i t y of o b j e c t s as a b a s i c n o t i o n t h a t need not be 
defined f o r each world by the L e i b n i z - p r i n c i p l e of 
c o i n c i d e n c e of p r o p e r t i e s , or f o r d i f f e r e n t worlds by a 
r e s t r i c t e d L e i b n i z - p r i n c i p l e of c o i n c i d e n c e of 
" e s s e n t i a l " p r o p e r t i e s or something of t h a t s o r t . 
I n t r o d u c i n g c o u n t e r p a r t - r e l a t i o n s i n the sense of D. 
Lewis c e r t a i n l y makes f o r higher g e n e r a l i t y , but I know 
of no cases where t h i s i n c r e a s e i n g e n e r a l i t y i s 
f r u i t f u l , and t h e r e f o r e I p r e f e r s i m p l i c i t y . 
Since non-extensional contexts are very frequent i n 
n a t u r a l languages the use of the /^-operator i s somewhat 
t e d i o u s . Therefore we might e i t h e r t r e a t a l l f u n c t o r s as 
c o r r e l a t i n g extensions to i n t e n s i o n s , or a s s i g n 
i n t e n s i o n s to the expressions d i r e c t l y . But as we want to 
d i s t i n g u i s h , f o r i n s t a n c e , between q u a n t i f i c a t i o n over 
extensions and t h a t over i n t e n s i o n s , between 
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n over i n d i v i d u a l s and q u a n t i f i c a t i o n over 
i n d i v i d u a l concepts, we have to mark the d i f f e r e n c e 
s y n t a c t i c a l l y any way so t h a t we cannot hope to get o f f 
much cheaper by such approaches than i n languages of the 
Montague-type. 
IV 
I f L i s a n a t u r a l language and M an i n t e r p r e t e d 
Montague-language then a l o g i c a l grammar f o r L i s d e f i n e d 
by an a n a l y z i n g r e l a t i o n R(A,B) on T(M) x T ( L ) , where 
T(M) i s the s e t of w e l l - f o r m e d e x p r e s s i o n s of M and T(L) 
t h i s s e t f o r L, such t h a t 
1) For a l l B€T(L) t h e r e i s an A w i t h R(A,B). 
2) I f R(A,B) then the meaning of A i s a p o s s i b l e meaning 
of B. I f R i s e x p l i c i t l y d e f i n e d , a l l e s s e n t i a l 
grammatical concepts f o r L can be d e f i n e d from t h i s 
r e l a t i o n . 
I f R(A,B), then the e x p r e s s i o n A r e p r e s e n t s the 
d e e p - s t r u c t u r e of B w i t h c o n s t a n t s of M i n p l a c e of words 
or morphemes of L. There i s no need now t o s u p p l y 
a n a l y s e s of d e e p - s t r u c t u r e s i n the form of t h e i r 
d e r i v a t i o n s , s i n c e the s t r u c t u r e of the terms of M i s 
unambiguous. R may be taken to c o n t a i n the r u l e s of 
s u b s t i t u t i o n of the t e r m i n a l v o c a b u l a r y of L f o r 
grammatical symbols i n G e n e r a t i v e Grammar as w e l l as i t s 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l p a r t . 
V 
A n a l y z i n g r e l a t i o n s have been g i v e n o n l y f o r very s m a l l 
fragments of n a t u r a l languages. There are numerous 
d i f f i c u l t i e s t o overcome i f they are t o be d e f i n e d f o r 
l a r g e r and more i n t e r e s t i n g p a r t s of language. I s h a l l 
o n l y mention some to convey an i m p r e s s i o n of the 
c o m p l e x i t y of a l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of n a t u r a l language: 
1) F i r s t t here i s the s y n t a c t i c a l problem t h a t l o g i c a l 
deep s t r u c t u r e , i . e . the s t r u c t u r e of the terms of M, i s 
o f t e n very d i f f e r e n t from the s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e of the 
terms of L. T h i s makes f o r very complicated 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , and t h e r e f o r e i s an i n c e n t i v e to change 
the u s u a l l o g i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Take the f o l l o w i n g two 
examples: 
a) Q u a n t i f i e r s l i k e "everybody", "somebody", and "nobody" 
are t r e a t e d i n EnglishJLike proper names i n the sentences 
Joe s i n g s , Everybody s i n g s , Nobody s i n g s . Instead of 
r e p r e s e n t i n g those sentences i n the u s u a l f o r m G ( a ) , 
AxG(x) and1xG(x), there have been attempts t h e r e f o r e , to 
a s s i m i l a t e proper names to q u a n t i f i e r s by t r e a t i n g them 
as f u n c t o r s of category a ( o * ( v ) ) , or by t r e a t i n g 
q u a n t i f i e r s ("a man", " a l l men", "no man"), as w e l l as 
proper names, as names f o r bundles of p r o p e r t i e s (the 
" u n i v e r s a l - g e n e r i c man" having those p r o p e r t i e s t h a t a l l 
men have, the " e x i s t e n t i a l - g e n e r i c man" having the 
p r o p e r t i e s t h a t some man has e t c . ) . Cf. Lewis (70), e.g. 
b) In the German sentences 
a ) F r i t z s i n g t l a u t ( F r i t s s i n g s l o u d l y ) 
ß ) F r i t z s i n g t gern ( F r i t z l i k e s to s i n g ) 
Y ) F r i t z s i n g t w a h r s c h e i n l i c h (Probably F r i t z s i n g s ) 
the adverbs have the same f u n c t i o n i n s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e 
though l o g i c a l l y they are to be t r e a t e d q u i t e 
d i f f e r e n t l y : " w a h r s c h e i n l i c h " i s a p p l i e d to the 
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t F r i t z s i n g s , " l a u t " c h a r a c t e r i z e s the 
verb, and "gern" has i t s e l f the f u n c t i o n of a verb, as 
becomes apparent i n the E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n s . The u s u a l 
l o g i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of the three sentences would look 
something l i k e t h i s V F ( S ( f ) A f ( a ) A L ( f ) ) ("There i s an 
a c t i o n of s i n g i n g t h a t F r i t z performs and t h a t has the 
p r o p e r t y of being l o u d " ) , F ( a , g ) , and P ( f ( a ) ) . " s i n g t " 
occurs i n (a) as a 2nd-order p r e d i c a t e , i n (ß) and (y) as 
a 1st-order p r e d i c a t e . 
These two examples show t h a t we should l o o k f o r non-
st a n d a r d l o g i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f o r d i n a r y language 
sentences c l o s e t o t h e i r s y n t a c t i c a l s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e . 
2) G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , t h e r e i s a v a r i a b i l i t y and 
p l a s t i c i t y o f the terms o f n a t u r a l languages q u i t e 
u n p a r a l l e l e d i n l o g i c . The same term o f L o f t e n has t o be 
c o o r d i n a t e d by the a n a l y z i n g r e l a t i o n R to many 
c a t e g o r i a l l y and s e m a n t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t terms o f M. The 
t a s k o f g e t t i n g along w i t h a minimum of morphemes wi t h o u t 
ending up w i t h ambiguity i n too many cases i s s o l v e d much 
b e t t e r by n a t u r a l languages, i t seems, than by l o g i c . I t 
i s q u i t e an i n t e r e s t i n g problem whether we c o u l d not do 
b e t t e r i n l o g i c even i f we h o l d on, as we s h o u l d , t o the 
p r i n c i p l e o f unambiguity i n a l l cases, 
3) B e s i d e s the s y n t a c t i c a l problems o f n a t u r a l languages 
a n a l y s i s t h e r e are semantic problems which c a l l f o r 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s o f the concept o f an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f M 
d e f i n e d i n D5. While we u s u a l l y o n l y c o n s i d e r e t e r n a l 
sentences i n l o g i c , many sentences o f L c o n t a i n i n d e x -
e x p r e s s i o n s l i k e " I " , "you", "here", "now", " y e s t e r d a y " , 
" t h i s " e t c . , whose e x t e n s i o n s v a r y f o r d i f f e r e n t 
u t t e r a n c e s o f the same sentence. T h e r e f o r e e x t e n s i o n s and 
i n t e n s i o n s must be d e f i n e d f o r u t t e r a n c e s , i . e . p a i r s 
<A,j> o f a sentence A and an o c c u r r e n c e o f A. I f J i s a 
s e t o f n - t u p l e s o f parameters, s p e c i f y i n g speaker, 
audience, t i m e , p l a c e , i n d i c a t e d t h i n g s e t c . , i . e . a s e t 
o f p o i n t s o f r e f e r e n c e , then we may i n t r o d u c e i n D5 
b e s i d e s i another index j f o r $ so t h a t $ (A) i s the 
e x t e n s i o n , X•14^ (A) the i n t e n s i o n o f thé^ u t t e r a n c e 
<A,j> o f A , W h i l e X * j * ( A ) i s the e x t e n s i o n and 
X * i j (A) the i n t e n s i o n o f ^ F i e sentence A. 
i j 
There i s , however, no o b v i o u s l i m i t a t i o n o f the 
parameters i n j , so t h a t we should perhaps take j j u s t as 
an index f o r a s p a c e - t i m e - p o i n t i n i where A was u t t e r e d , 
as suggested by D.Lewis i n ( 6 9 ) . The i d e a i s t h a t i f we 
know t h i s p o i n t j and wor l d i we know a l l the r e l e v a n t 
d e t a i l s of the u t t e r a n c e : speaker, l i s t e n e r , o b j e c t ( s ) 
spoken about e t c . The meaning of an u t t e r a n c e may a l s o 
depend, f o r i n s t a n c e , on the f a c t s o bvious f o r speaker 
and audience i n the s i t u a t i o n of i t s o c c u r r e n c e as i n the 
sentence " I s h a l l now go (which may mean: walk, d r i v e , go 
by t r a i n , f l y ) to Boston". 
4) In o r d i n a r y language t h e r e are w e l l - f o r m e d but 
meaningless e x p r e s s i o n s , as "17 l a u g h s " , "The King o f 
B a v a r i a i s s i t t i n g i n the au d i e n c e " , " I f you were a l i v e , 
you c o u l d read t h i s paper", e t c . Most e m p i r i c a l 
p r e d i c a t e s are not d e f i n e d f o r a l l s y n t a c t i c a l l y 
a d m i s s i b l e arguments and many sentences f o r b e i n g 
m e a n i n g f u l presuppose t h a t something i s the case which i n 
f a c t may not be the case at a l l . T h e r e f o r e we s h o u l d , 
f o l l o w i n g D. S c o t t i n ( 7 0 ) , d e f i n e the s e t s of p o s s i b l e 
e x t e n s i o n s f o r the non-basic c a t e g o r i e s by 
(E E = E p,U) ( I ) 
X ( p ) , U t,U K ' and E = E , l ( l ) , U x , u 
(B) 
where A i s the s e t of f u n c t i o n s from s u b s e t s o f B i n t o 
A. 
5) B e s i d e s s y n t a c t i c a l a m b i g u i t y (As " F l y i n g p l a n e s can 
be dangerous") and pragmatic a m b i g u i t y (as i n "The 
problem I mentioned above was f i r s t noted by Qu i n e " ) . As 
semantic a m b i g u i t y i s o f t e n e l i m i n a t e d by the c o n t e x t 
("Peter i s going to the bank t o cash a cheque"), we 
sho u l d not r e p r e s e n t a l l ambiguous words by d i f f e r e n t 
c o n s t a n t s of M. I n s t e a d we might a s s i g n 
c l a s s e s of e x t e n s i o n s t o e x p r e s s i o n s and f o r m u l a t e the 
c o n d i t i o n s i n D5 t h u s : 
a) <t>.(a) c E f o r a l l c o n s t a n t s a of c a t e g o r y x. 
b) * (F(t>) = {yeE : Vaß(a€<J> (F) A ße$ ( t ) A a(ß)=v)} 
i x,U i i 
c) 4> (XxA[x]) i s t h a t c l a s s of f u n c t i o n s fl6E, v such 
i x(p),U 
t h a t f o r a l l <*>' w i t h = 4>f (b)={a} and <t>» (b) = * f (b) 
b i j i 
f o r a l l j € l t h e r e i s a ß e * 1 (A[b]> w i t h f ( a ) = ß. 
d) * (s = s» ) = tv€E : Vaß(a€<Ms) A ß€4> ( s f ) A (a=ß A v = t ) 
v(a=ß Avj = f ) ) } . a , U 1 1 
e) <t>.(ut) = { f € l tl : AjVa(ae<t> ( t ) A f ( j ) = a)}. 
• T,U j 
Then an e x p r e s s i o n t i s unambiguous i n i i f f 4> i s a 
u n i t - c l a s s . We may then a l s o abandon p a r t i a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as c o n s i d e r e d under ( 4 ) , s i n c e we can 
r e p r e s e n t a f u n c t i o n f=4>(F)€E (E ,)which i s d e f i n e d i T,U p.U on the subset E'cE by the s e t of f u n c t i o n s from E p,U E p,U K T,U c o i n c i d i n g on E 1 w i t h f . "Laugh", f o r i n s t a n c e , 
may be so i n t e r p r e t e d , t h a t i t s e x t e n s i o n i s a s e t o f 
f u n c t i o n s from E , which have the same v a l u e s o n l y cr(v) ,U 
f o r human beings as arguments. So the sentence " P e t e r 
l a u g h s " i s unambiguous and has o n l y one t r u t h v a l u e as 
e x t e n s i o n , w h i l e the sentence "17 l a u g h s " has as i t s 
e x t e n s i o n the s e t o f both t r u t h v a l u e s . 
6) Not a l l d i f f e r e n c e s i n meaning can be r e p r e s e n t e d by 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n e x t e n s i o n . The two sentences "Jack 
2 
b e l i e v e s t h a t 2+2=4" and "Jack b e l i e v e s , t h a t dx /dx=2x" 
may have d i f f e r e n t t r u t h - v a l u e s though "2+2=4" and 
"dx /dx=2x" have the same i n t e n s i o n s , as we saw. There 
i s one approach t o meaning, f i r s t taken by S. K r i p k e i n 
h i s completeness p r o o f s f o r the modal systems S1, S2 and 
S3, e n v i s a g i n g abnormal w o r l d s , i n which not a l l 
l o g i c a l l y t r u e sentences h o l d . T h i s has the advantage o f 
f o r m a l s i m p l i c i t y , but t h e r e i s no way o f d e t e r m i n i n g 
what s o r t of absurd w o r l d s we s h o u l d assume t o account 
f o r the l o g i c a l i n c a p a b i l i t i e s of a l l p o s s i b l e people i n 
a l l our p o s s i b l e w o r l d s . 
Another approach i s t h i s : We i n t r o d u c e i n d i c e s k£K f o r 
the terms of M. Let k(A) be the index o f the term A. 
Then we d e f i n e 4> ^ as i n D5 and i n t r o d u c e an o p e r a t o r K' 
such t h a t * l x t ) = X*i<ï> ( t ) . T h i s way we a s s i g n a i , k i , k ( t ) term t an i n t e n s i o n f o r every c o n t e x t A, r e p r e s e n t e d by 
k ( A ) , i n which i t o c c u r s . 
* can, f o r i n s t a n c e , be d e f i n e d so t h a t i ,k 
<S> (xs)=<ï> (x t ) i f f t i s o b t a i n e d from s by i . k i , k 
s u b s t i t u t i n g c o n s t a n t s w i t h the same i n t e n s i o n s . Then 
t h i s concept of meaning c o i n c i d e s w i t h Carnap's n o t i o n o f 
i n t e n s i o n a l isomorphism i n ( 4 7 ) . Carnap suggested as a 
c r i t e r i o n f o r i d e n t i t y o f meaning f o r the terms of a 
f o r m a l language, t h a t they be constructed from 
i n t e n s i o n a l l y i d e n t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s i n the same 
s y n t a c t i c a l way. 
7) B e s i d e s d e s c r i p t i v e sentences n a t u r a l languages a l s o 
c o n t a i n q u e s t i o n s , i m p e r a t i v e s , e x c l a m a t i o n s , guesses, 
s u g g e s t i o n s e t c . As has been emphasized e s p e c i a l l y by 
J.L. A u s t i n i n (55) and J.R. S e a r l e i n (70) a semantics 
of n a t u r a l language has a l s o t o account f o r these 
i l l o c u t i o n a r y modes of sentences or u t t e r a n c e s . 
We may, however, a s s i g n the q u e s t i o n , f I s Tom coming?" as 
an u t t e r a n c e , addressed by John t o Jack, the 
( d e s c r i p t i v e ) meaning of the a s s e r t i o n "John asks Jack, 
whether Tom i s coming" as i t s p e r f o r m a t o r y meaning. And 
the q u e s t i o n " I s Tom coming?", as a sentence, can be 
a s s i g n e d the d e s c r i p t i v e meaning of the p r e d i c a t e " t o 
ask, whether Tom i s coming". In t h i s way, which i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l w i t h what D. Lewis proposed i n 
( 7 0 ) , we can, w i t h the h e l p of i l l o c u t i o n a r y v e rbs l i k e 
" o r d e r " , "ask", "promise" e t c . , d e f i n e the semantics f o r 
oth e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y modes i n the framework of a semantics 
f o r a s s e r t i o n s . 
So the attempt at a l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s o f n a t u r a l language 
suggests q u i t e a few s y n t a c t i c a l and s e m a n t i c a l 
m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f the language M. B e s i d e s such s p e c i f i c 
problems encountered i n l o g i c a l grammar f o r n a t u r a l 
languages we should a l s o mention some fundamental 
o b j e c t i o n s t h a t have been r a i s e d a g a i n s t the whole 
p r o j e c t : 
1) N a t u r a l languages are vague i n many r e s p e c t s , 
s y n t a c t i c a l and s e m a n t i c a l . A n a l y s i n g such languages, i t 
has been s a i d , by a s s i g n i n g them exact l o g i c a l 
d e s c r i p t i o n s i s t h e r e f o r e inadequate i n p r i n c i p l e s i n c e 
i t p r o j e c t s on them a h i g h e r degree o f p r e c i s i o n than 
they a c t u a l l y have and i s t h e r e f o r e a m o d i f i c a t i o n r a t h e r 
than a d e s c r i p t i o n . I t i s not the t a s k o f a grammar o f a 
language L to t r a n s f o r m L i n t o a p r e c i s e language i n the 
sense o f l o g i c , but to m i r r o r f a i t h f u l l y the p r o p e r t i e s L 
a c t u a l l y has. 
T h i s i s not j u s t the d i f f i c u l t y o f how t o d e r i v e the 
p r o p e r t i e s o f a n a t u r a l language from o b s e r v a t i o n s o f how 
i t i s used, as D. Lewis suggests i n ( 6 9 ) , but as a 
n a t u r a l language i t i s not something p r e c i s e but f u z z y 
a l l o v e r . I n s t e a d o f a w e l l - d e f i n e d c l a s s o f w e l l - f o r m e d 
e x p r e s s i o n s t h e r e are degrees o f grammaticalness; i n s t e a d 
o f p r e d i c a t e s w i t h w e l l - d e f i n e d domains t h e r e are 
p r e d i c a t e s more or l e s s w e l l - d e f i n e d f o r d i f f e r e n t 
arguments; i n s t e a d o f a w e l l - d e f i n e d c l a s s o f p o s s i b l e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f a term t t h e r e i s a c l a s s o f more or 
l e s s p o s s i b l e o r n a t u r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t . 
In view o f t h i s John R. Ross i n ( 7 3 ) gave the a d v i c e t o 
grammarians: "You have t o get y o u r s e l f t h i n k i n g the f u z z y 
way!" Now, f o r l o g i c i a n s at l e a s t , t h i s cannot mean 
t h i n k i n g the vague or u n p r e c i s e way, but o n l y t h i n k i n g 
the comparative i n s t e a d of the c l a s s i f i c a t o r y way. T h i s 
means t h a t , a f t e r the more fundamental d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
l o g i c a l grammar are overcome, we should t h i n k of d e f i n i n g 
n o t i o n s l i k e " E x p r e s s i o n s i s more well-formed than 
e x p r e s s i o n t " , " $ i s a more t y p i c a l (or normal) 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t than <t , f l and "s i s l e s s vague than 
t " . In t h a t way we may a l s o d e f i n e comparative concepts 
of synonymy and a n a l y t i c i t y , as advocated by Quine. I f , 
j u s t to g i v e an example, we have a r e l a t i o n of 
comparative s i m i l a r i t y of w o r l d s , as employed f o r 
i n s t a n c e by R. S t a l n a k e r i n (68) and D. Lewis i n (73) i n 
t h e i r analyses of c o n d i t i o n a l s , we might say t h a t 
sentence A i s at most as a n a l y t i c a l as B i f f A-worlds 
are at l e a s t as s i m i l a r to the r e a l world as B-worlds. 
Such comparative concepts c e r t a i n l y make f o r higher 
c o m p l e x i t y , but I see no a p r i o r i reasons why l o g i c 
should not be able to m i r r o r the f u z z i n e s s of n a t u r a l 
languages t h i s way. 
2) Accounting f o r vagueness i n t h i s way would a l s o s o l v e 
another fundamental problem, pointed out by Quine: The 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of M - and i f we analyze a n a t u r a l 
language L w i t h the help of M a l s o t h a t of L - depends on 
the set I of p o s s i b l e worlds. Now we cannot take I to be 
the s e t of a l l l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e w o r l d s , s i n c e the 
a n a l y t i c sentences of L are to hold i n a l l worlds of I . 
I f , on the other hand, we determine I as the set of 
worlds i n which a l l a n a l y t i c sentences of L h o l d , then I 
i s not w e l l - d e f i n e d s i n c e , as Quine has c o n v i n c i n g l y 
shown, the set of a n a l y t i c sentences i s not w e l l d e f i n e d . 
There i s no f i r m boundary between a n a l y t i c and s y n t h e t i c 
t r u t h s , and w i t h a l i t t l e i n g e n u i t y yoi> can always t h i n k 
of b i z a r r e words, where the v a l i d i t y of supposedly 
a n a l y t i c statements becomes d o u b t f u l . But i f we admit 
p a r t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , vagueness and a comparative 
concept of a n a l y t i c i t y , we can take I to be the set of 
a l l l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e w o r l d s , 5-dimensional ones and 
those w i t h married b a c h e l o r s i n c l u d e d , but w i t h the non-
l o g i c a l terms (almost) undefined there. 
3) The most fundamental o b j e c t i o n against i n t e n s i o n a l 
semantics, at l a s t , comes to t h i s : The whole approach of 
t h i s semantics i s based on the r e a l i s t i c i d e a , that we 
confer extensions, i n t e n s i o n s , and meanings on l i n g u i s t i c 
expressions by c o o r d i n a t i n g e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c e n t i t i e s , 
concrete t h i n g s , a t t r i b u t e s , p r o p o s i t i o n s e t c . to them. 
That way we can a b s t r a c t semantics from pragmatics, 
semantic c o o r d i n a t i o n from the use of the expressions i n 
accordance with these c o r r e l a t i o n s . But t h i s idea has 
been questioned w i t h , as I b e l i e v e , very sound arguments 
from P e i r c e onward. The slogan of today*s Philosophy of 
Language i s : "The meaning of a word i s determined by i t s 
use". Use, t h e r e f o r e , comes before, not a f t e r meaning, 
and t h e r e f o r e pragmatics, not semantics, i s the 
fundamental d i s c i p l i n e . Though we can c e r t a i n l y 
d i s t i n g u i s h and i d e n t i f y many p r o p e r t i e s and f a c t s 
without the use of language, a l a r g e and important c l a s s 
of concepts and p r o p o s i t i o n s i s defined only with the 
help of l i n g u i s t i c d i s t i n c t i o n s . In t h i s sense 
W i t t g e n s t e i n s a i d : "How do I know that t h i s c o l o r i s 
red?" - An agjftyer would be: " I have learned E n g l i s h " 
((53),381). Semantics, t h e r e f o r e , i s not a theory of 
c o r r e l a t i o n s of words with meanings, defined 
independently of language, but i t has to be based on a 
theory of l i n g u i s t i c behavior. 
In h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n to "Word and Object" (60), p.IX Quine 
s a i d : "Language i s a s o c i a l a r t . In a c q u i r i n g i t we have 
to depend e n t i r e l y on i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y a v a i l a b l e cues as 
what to say and when. Hence there i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
c o l l a t i n g l i n g u i s t i c meanings, unless i n terms of men's 
d i s p o s i t i o n s to respond o v e r t l y to s o c i a l l y observable 
s t i m u l a t i o n s . " 
His "hence", however, i s a non s e q u i t u r : Every semantics 
that i s u s e f u l f o r the a n a l y s i s of l i n g u i s t i c phenomena 
i s t h e r eby p r a c t i c a l l y j u s t i f i e d , no matter what 
t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s i t employs - i f i t makes no 
p r e t e n s e of b e i n g a b l e t o e x p l a i n the fundamental f a c t s 
of language. That, however, has never been the aim of 
i n t e n s i o n a l s e m a n t i c s . A deeper, p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s 
o f meaning has t o s t a r t from l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n s i n 
the sense of D. Lewis i n (69) or from n o n - n a t u r a l meaning 
i n the sense of P. G r i c e . But i t can a l s o be shown t h a t 
the d e s c r i p t i o n s of meanings i n the framework of 
i n t e n s i o n a l semantics may be based upon d e s c r i p t i o n s of 
such c o n v e n t i o n s . 
To sum up t h i s b r i e f survey we can say then t h a t 
i n t e n s i o n a l semantics f o r n a t u r a l languages, though s t i l l 
f a c i n g a l o t of problems, has proved t o be a very 
e f f e c t i v e i n s t r u m e n t f o r l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s e s . From a 
l o g i c a l p o i n t of view i t s i n t e r e s t l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t 
a c l o s e r look at the phenomena of n a t u r a l languages i s 
g i v i n g new s t i m u l a t i o n s t o l o g i c a l developments. L o g i c , 
i n the p r o c e s s of i t s c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h l i n g u i s t i c s has 
become more i n t e r e s t i n g a g a i n - at l e a s t f o r 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y minded people. 
